Ravenna appears not as a fully described city but as a decisive strategic reference point in the book’s arguments about conquest, military dependence, and national arms. It is associated first with the defeat of auxiliary forces summoned by Pope Julius II and later with a battlefield example used to compare Spanish infantry with German troops trained in the Swiss manner. In both cases, Ravenna turns abstract political principles into concrete evidence: foreign assistance may imperil the ruler who requests it, while disciplined national forces can exploit the precise weaknesses of an opposing army.

Ravenna as a Military Test Case

Ravenna’s first major function is to expose the danger of auxiliary troops. Pope Julius II, seeking to gain Ferrara after the poor performance of his mercenaries, arranged with Ferdinand of Spain for horse and foot soldiers. These auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, a result that, according to the book’s general rule, should have left the Pope ruined or captive to the force he had summoned. His position was saved only by an unexpected intervention: the Swiss descended upon the country and drove the victors out. The reversal meant that Julius was captured neither by his enemies, who had been scattered, nor by his auxiliaries, because victory had ultimately been won by other forces.

The episode gives Ravenna a sharply ironic significance. The Pope’s reliance on foreign arms produced the very danger he had hoped to overcome, and his survival did not vindicate the decision; it merely reflected good fortune rescuing him from an ill-considered policy. Auxiliary troops are portrayed as united and controlled by their own officers, so their defeat destroys the prince who depends on them, while their victory leaves him at their mercy. Ravenna therefore illustrates the distinction between escaping disaster and governing wisely.

Infantry and the Conditions of Victory

The book returns to Ravenna when discussing the defects of supposedly formidable foreign infantry. Spanish infantry and Swiss-style German companies are each respected, but neither is invulnerable. The Spaniards are said to be unable to resist cavalry, while the Swiss system is vulnerable to resolute infantry fighting at close quarters. Ravenna supplies the practical indication for the second claim: Spanish infantry confronted German companies whose discipline resembled that of the Swiss.

At the battle, Spanish agility and the use of bucklers enabled the infantry to force its way beneath the Germans’ pikes and reach close quarters. Once the Germans could no longer use their pikes effectively, they were exposed and unable to defend themselves. The Spanish would have routed them completely had cavalry not charged and intervened. Ravenna thus functions as a laboratory of military adaptation: victory depends not simply on reputation or formal discipline, but on whether one force can bring its own strengths against the particular weakness of another.

Relation to National Arms

The Ravenna example supports the broader demand for national troops. The book argues that a prince should prefer forces under his own command to both mercenaries and auxiliaries, even accepting defeat with national arms rather than victory achieved through foreign aid. The relevant question is not merely whether soldiers are brave in isolation, but who controls them and whose political purposes their success ultimately serves.

Ravenna makes this argument concrete in two contrasting ways. In the first, foreign auxiliaries fail and leave the ruler dependent on events beyond his control. In the second, infantry trained according to one system exploits the limitations of another. Together, the episodes imply that a state’s security requires both political ownership of its army and intelligent reform of its discipline. A new prince can acquire reputation and importance by reorganizing existing forces rather than simply importing a celebrated military model.

Historical and Analytical Significance

Although the text does not develop Ravenna’s geography, institutions, or inhabitants, the place acquires significance through recurrence. It marks the point where an argument about military organization is tested against remembered warfare. The same setting supports a warning about auxiliaries and an example of tactical possibility, linking political sovereignty to battlefield method.

Ravenna also belongs to the book’s comparative historical method. The writer places recent Italian events beside ancient examples and uses their different outcomes to derive general rules. The defeat of auxiliaries at Ravenna demonstrates the peril of surrendering control to another power; the struggle between Spanish and German infantry demonstrates that military systems contain specific, exploitable weaknesses. Ravenna therefore stands as a compact emblem of the book’s central insistence that rulers must foresee danger, understand the character of the forces available to them, and rely on their own arms rather than on another power’s strength.